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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cullin Sims appeals from the district court's order dismissing his Petition for Post
Conviction Relief ("Petition"). Mr. Sims asserts he raised an issue of material fact as to
whether his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to consult with him about moving to
withdraw his guilty plea and file a motion to suppress following the issuance of
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _ , 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) by the United States

Supreme Court.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On January 24, 2013, Mr. Sims was charged with with felony eluding, feiony
aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter, DUI), felony possession
of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing law enforcement.
(R., pp.68-70.) On April 4, 2013, Mr. Sims pleaded guilty to the aggravated DUI and the
State dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.58-61.) On May 30, 2013, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with seven and one-half years fixed,
upon Mr. Cullen.

(R., pp.71-73.)

Mr. Sims timely appealed.

(State's Exhibit 1.)

Mr. Sims conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal. See State v. Cullen Robert
Sims, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 626 (Ct. App. July 17, 2014).

On August 22, 2013, Mr. Sims filed his Petition asserting the his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file:

(1) an appeal his sentence; (2) a motion to suppress

statements made by him while in the hospital in a "sub-conscious" state; and (3) a
motion to suppress the non-consensual blood draw taken at the hospital. (R., p.5.) In
his prayer for relief, Mr. Sims wrote, "I am asking this Court to find that my attorney was
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ineffective for not filing the proper pre-trial [m]otions, and that the failure of that action
has allowed me to enter a plea of guilty to a charge 'unknowingly and unintelligently."'
(R., p.6.) In his affidavit, Mr. Sims attested:
At the time that I was unconscious in the hospital, and without my consent,
and without a warrant of any kind, my blood was taken from me and given
to the Police. (Or the results of tests upon my blood). This was used as
evidence in my criminal case to establish probable cause.
I believe that my attorney should have filed a Motion to suppress this
evidence. I believe that my plea of guilty is not entered into "knowingly
and intelligently" because if my attorney would have filed a Motion to
Suppress the evidence of the illegally taken blood or bodily fluids, and if
the Motion would have been successful, I wou!d not have entered into a
plea of guilty.
I asked my attorney to perform the activities that I have described herein.
My attorney told me that the Motion to Suppress were a waste of time, and
my attorney would not file these Motions.
(R., pp.10-11.) Then, in his Memorandum in Support of Petition, Mr. Sims argued that
his case was similar to McNeely in that his blood was taken without a warrant.
(R., pp.16-18.) Mr. Sims asked for and was appointed conflict counsel to assist in his
post conviction action. (R., pp.20-26, 30-31.)
The State filed an Answer and Motion for Judicial Notice, asking the district court
to take judicial notice of the Information, Judgment and Commitment and the transcripts
from the change of plea and sentencing hearings.
then filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal.

(R., pp.38-40, 51-52.) The State

(R., pp.101-102.)

argued that the Petition should be dismissed because:

The State generally

( 1) there was insufficient

material and documentation to warrant an evidentiary hearing; (2) "[t]he ineffective
assistance of counsel allegations again do not have any supporting information
sufficient to shat that there was defective performance by the attorney handling his
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case"; and (3) "there is zero evidence in the Petition to indicate that 'but for' the deficient
or ineffective conduct, the results would have been different." (R., p.103.)
On January 28, 2014, the district court entered its Summary Dismissal of
Allegations 7.8 (failure to suppress statements) and 7.C (failure to suppress blood
results); Notice of Hearing on 7.A (failure to appeal).

(R., pp.108-117.) The district

court concluded that:
In reviewing all of the evidence presented for the summary dismissal, the
Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
counsel's performance was deficient in not filing the alleged motions to
suppress. The Petitioner has not shown a material issue of fact exists on
whether the Petitioner's counsel should have filed these motions and he
has not shown that the filing of such motions was not freely and voluntarily
waived upon the Defendant's guilty plea.
(R., pp.114.)

Then, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed

Mr. Sims' final claim of error. (R., pp.125-128.) Mr. Sims timely appealed. (R., pp.132134.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Sims' petition for post-conviction relief without
conducting an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial attorney failed to consult
with him and file a motion to suppress the results of the warrantless, non-consensual
blood draw conducted upon him?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Sims' Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
Without Conducting An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That His Trial Attorney Failed
To Consult With Him And File A Motion To Suppress The Results Of The Warrantless,
Non-Consensual Blood Draw Conducted Upon Him
A.

Introduction
Following a traffic accident, Mr. Sims was taken to the hospital and a warrantless

blood draw was conducted upon him.

On April 4, 2013, Mr. Sims entered a plea of

guilty to aggravated DUI. On April 17, 2013, the United

Supreme Court issued

its opinion in Missouri v. McNeely which reiterated that there is no per se exception to
the warrant requirement and cases must be

based on the totality of the

circumstances.

McNee/y's application to his

~Jlr. Sims' trial attorney failed

case, and did not move to withdraw his guilty

file a motion

results of the warrantless blood draw. For the reasons

forth below, Mr. Sims asserts

suppress the

that the district court erred in dismissing his claim that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to discuss the ramifications of McNeely, move to withdraw his guilty plea, and file
a motion to suppress.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards

1.

Summary Dismissal Standards

An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State,
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I .C. § 19-4903. The
application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations,
or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
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The cowi may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction reiief when the
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by
further proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case
where evidentiary facts are not disputecl, summary dismissal may be appropriate,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac,
145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where the State did not file a response to
the petition) (citing Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982)
{addressing case with stipulated facts).) However, where the facts are disputed, a court
is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but need not
accept the petitioner's conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a
material issue of fact. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.

Baldwin v.

State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008).
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903
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(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v.
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997).

C.

A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Trial Counsel Rendered Deficient
Performance When He Failed To Consult With Mr. Sims, Move To Withdraw His
Guilty Plea 1 And File A Motion To Suppress The Results Of The Warrantless,
Non-Consensual Blood Draw Conducted Upon Him

1.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through
post-conviction proceedings.

Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765 (Ct. App. 2008). The

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a criminal
case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984 ).

Further, the Constitution

guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic
elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment,
including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685.
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id.
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct
more likely than not aitered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),

If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established
by a preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal
proceeding would have been different, that decision would be
"diametrically different," "opposite in character or nature," and "mutually
opposed" to our clearly established precedent because we held in
Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a "reasonable
probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).

2.

A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Sims' Trial Failed To
Consult With Him Regarding McNeely And Abide By His Request To File
A Motion To Suppress

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal
defense counsel's conduct is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279 (1998).

According to the prevailing standards, defense counsel, "[a]fter informing himself or
herself fully on the facts and the law, defense counsel should advise the accused with
complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including a candid estimate of the
probable outcome."

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense

Function, (3d ed. 1991 ), Defense Function, Standard 4-5.1 (a).
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In the instant case, on April 4, 2013, Mr. Sims entered a plea of guilty to
aggravated DUI. (R., pp.58-60.) Then, prior to Mr. Sims' sentencing, on April 17, 2013,
the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.
__ , 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), wherein the Court rejected the notion that a DUI
investigation, by itself, justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement.

In McNeely,

the respondent was validly stopped and after declining to take a breath test, was
arrested and taken to a nearby hospital for a blood draw. Id. at 1557-1558. At the
hospital, Mr. McNeely refused to consent to the blood draw, but the officer ordered the
technician to take the blood anyway.
search warrant.
percent.

Id.

Id.

Id.

The officer never attempted to secure a

Mr. McNeely's blood alcohol content ("BAG") measured at .154

McNeely's suppression motion was granted and the Missouri Supreme

Court affirmed the lower court's order granting suppression of the BAC results, relying
on Schmerber. Id.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a

split in the circuits as to whether "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream
establishes a per se exigency that it suffices on its own to justify and exception to the
warrant requirement. ... " Id. at 1558.
The McNeely Court held that it did not: "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be
drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth
Amendment mandates that they do that."

Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1561.

The Court first

recognized the importance of the privacy interest at stake, holding that "absent an
emergency, no less [than a warrant] could be required where intrusions in to the human
body are concerned," and that the importance of a determination by a neutral and

9

detached magistrate before law enforcement is allowed to "invade another's body in
search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great." Id. at 1558. The Court reiterated
what was seemingly forgotten by lower courts after Schmerber. to determine whether
an officer faced an emergency which would justify alleviating the requirement of a
warrant, the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1559. The Court
concluded, "[w]e hold that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of
alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to
justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." Id. at 1568. Following McNeely, the
Idaho Supreme Court recognized that Idaho's implied consent law, or at least the
Court's interpretation of it, violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

See State v. Arrotta, 2014 Opinion No. 137 (Dec. 18, 2014); State v.

Wulff, 2014 Opinion No. 105 (Oct. 29, 2014).

In his Petition, Mr. Sims alleged that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to
file a motion to suppress the non-consensual blood draw taken at the hospital. (R., p.5.)
Mr. Sims further alleged that his attorney's failures have "allowed me to enter a plea of
guilty to

a charge

'unknowingly and

unintelligently."'

(R.,

p.6.)

Further,

the

uncontradicted evidence provided in his affidavit states that his blood was taken without
his consent and without a warrant.

(R., p.10.) Moreover Mr. Sims attested that he

asked his attorney to file a motion to suppress and his attorney refused to file said
motion. (R., pp.10-11.) However, had Mr. Sims' attorney kept abreast with the current
state of the law, the attorney would have known of the McNeely decision and its direct
applicability to Mr. Sims'. It is apparent, based upon the uncontroverted evidence in this
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case, that Mr. Sims' raised an issue of material fact as to his trial attorney's failure to
advise him on all relevant law and file all necessary pretrial motions.

3.

Mr. Sims Was Prejudiced By His Trial Attorney's Failures Because Had
Mr. Sims Been Properly Advised And All Necessary Motions Filed, The
Results From The Warrantless Blood Draw Would Have Likely Been
Suppressed

Had Mr. Sims trial counsel properly advised him on the current state of the law,
he would have been successful on motion to withdraw his guilty plea and on his
suppression motion. "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).

The uncontroverted

evidence set forth in the Petition and its supporting affidavit is that Mr. Sims wanted his
attorney to file a suppression motion related to warrantless blood draw results.
(R., pp.5-6, 10-11.)

a.

There Is A Reasonable Probability Mr. Sims Would Have Been
Allowed To Withdraw His Guilty Plea

The United States Supreme Court opinion in McNeely was published 13 days
after Mr. Sims entered his plea of guilty to aggravated DUI.

However, because

Mr. Sims had still not been sentenced, he could still seek to withdraw his guilty plea by
showing a "just reason." The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea falls within the discretion of the district court. State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358,
361 (Ct. App. 1997). Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that "[a] motion to withdraw a
guilty plea may be made only before [the] sentence is imposed or imposition of [the]
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may
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set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea." Id. The timing of the motion to withdraw a guilty plea affects the exercise of the
trial court's discretion.

State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801 (1988).

A motion to

withdraw a guilty plea filed after sentencing can only be granted to correct a "manifest
injustice."

Id.

"This strict standard is justified to insure that an accused is not

encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of the potential punishment and withdraw
the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe. State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68 (Ct. App.
2000 ); (citing McFarland, 130 Idaho at 361, 941 P.2d at 333 ).
A less rigorous standard is applied to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed prior
to sentencing. Ballard, 114 Idaho at 801. However, the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior
to sentencing is not an automatic right. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481 , 485 (1993 ). In
Ward, the Idaho Court of Appeals articulated the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea
prior to sentencing, stating:
A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing must
show a 'just reason' for withdrawing the guilty plea. The 'just reason'
standard does not require that a defendant establish a constitutional
defect in his or her guilty plea. Once the defendant has met this burden,
the state may avoid a withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the
existence of prejudice to the state. The defendant's failure to present and
support a plausible reason will dictate against granting the withdrawal,
even absent prejudice to the prosecution . . . the district court is
encouraged to liberally exercise its discretion in granting a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea.
Ward, 135 Idaho at 72 (internal citations omitted).

Here, at the time of the Mr. Sims' guilty plea, the McNeely opinion had not yet
been published by the United States Supreme Court, so Mr. Sims was unaware of a
potential defense he had in his case. Certainly, a viable suppression motion rises to the
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level of a just reason for withdrawing a piea of guilty. Accordingly, Mr. Sims' guilty plea
was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.

b.

There Is A Reasonable Probability That Mr. Sims' Motion To
Suppress Would Have Been Granted

The failure of counsel to file a motion to suppress will satisfy the prejudice prong
of the ineffective assistance of counsel test where the reviewing court determines that
the evidence at issue would have been suppressed. State v. Mathews, ·J 33 Idaho 300,
308 (1999); see also Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)(finding that when
failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is principal allegation of
ineffectiveness, petitioner must also prove that Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious
and there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent
the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Id. at 375.
The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that Mr. Sims blood was taken
without a warrant and without his consent. (R., pp.5-6, 10-11.) Pursuant to McNeely
and the line of recent Idaho Supreme Court cases, Mr. Sims motion to suppress would
have been granted.

See State

v. Arrotta, 2014 Opinion No. 137 (Dec. 18, 2014);

State v. Wulff, 2014 Opinion No. 105 (Oct. 29, 2014). Thus, Mr. Sims was prejudiced

by his trial counsel's deficient performance.
According, the district court erred when it dismissed Mr. Sims claim that his trial
attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him on the relevant law an file the
necessary motion in his case.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Sims respectfully requests that this Court vacated the district court's order
dismissing his Petition and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 6 th day of January, 2015.

ERIC D. REDE ICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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